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Cyber situational awareness is an essential part of cyber defense
that allows the cybersecurity operators to cope with the complexity
of today’s networks and threat landscape. Perceiving and com-
prehending the situation allow the operator to project upcoming
events and make strategic decisions. In this paper, we recapitu-
late the fundamentals of cyber situational awareness and high-
light its unique characteristics in comparison to generic situational
awareness known from other fields. Subsequently, we provide an
overview of existing research and trends in publishing on the topic,
introduce front research groups, and highlight the impact of cyber
situational awareness research. Further, we propose an updated
taxonomy and enumeration of the components used for achiev-
ing cyber situational awareness. The updated taxonomy conforms
to the widely-accepted three-level definition of cyber situational
awareness and newly includes the projection level. Finally, we iden-
tify and discuss contemporary research and operational challenges,
such as the need to cope with rising volume, velocity, and variety
of cybersecurity data and the need to provide cybersecurity opera-
tors with the right data at the right time and increase their value
through visualization.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→ Formal securitymodels; •Networks
→ Network security.
KEYWORDS
Cyber situational awareness, network security, taxonomy
ACM Reference Format:
Martin Husák, Tomáš Jirsík, and Shanchieh Jay Yang. 2020. SoK: Contem-
porary Issues and Challenges to Enable Cyber Situational Awareness for
Network Security. In The 15th International Conference on Availability, Reli-
ability and Security (ARES 2020), August 25–28, 2020, Virtual Event, Ireland.
ACM,NewYork, NY, USA, 10 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3407023.3407062
1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber situational awareness (CSA) is an application of generic sit-
uational awareness (SA) into the cyber domain and a frequently
discussed topic in cybersecurity research and operations. Perceiv-
ing the cyber environment, understanding the current security
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situation, and being able to project how the situation will evolve is
an essential part of cyber defense and a goal of many researchers
and practitioners. As computer networks and systems continue to
increase in complexity and sophistication, the requirements and
demands on a cybersecurity operator increase as well. A concept
of CSA aims to provide an operator with a coherent methodology
to cope with the networks’ and systems’ complexity, gather all
necessary information, and to comprehend underlying processes
in these systems, and anticipate upcoming events. By building and
maintaining CSA, an operator is capable of making strategic deci-
sions even in the case of complex and sophisticated systems. The
approaches taken to achieve and maintain CSA should be continu-
ously updated and refined to reflect evolving threat landscape and
emerging domains and paradigms of computing and networking.
Although we focus on network security, there is still a lot of novel
phenomena influencing this field. For example, the adoption of
cloud computing disrupted the defense of network perimeters, and
the boom of IoT increased the number of devices, often vulnerable
and unprotected, in the Internet and local networks. There is also a
need to take into consideration the world of operational technology
as opposed to information technology and take care of the security
of ICS and SCADA systems, especially in critical infrastructures.
In this paper, we investigate the current status and challenges of
research on CSA. We start from fundamental definitions of SA and
CSA to provide a solid base for our work. Subsequently, we proceed
with a literature review and revisiting a taxonomy to catch the di-
rections taken by the research on CSA. Finally, we identify the weak
spots to set the challenges for future research and development.
The contribution of our work can be summarized in four points.
First, we put together existing definitions of SA and discuss how
they apply to CSA and cope with the cyber environment. Second,
we provide brief literature that is focused on trends in publishing
on the topic instead of analyzing the content of the publications.
The goal is to find if we are still discussing an emerging topic or if
the publication counts have culminated. The literature review also
enlists major research groups and influential people that contribute
or made a significant contribution to the field. Third, we revise an
existing taxonomy of CSA and its related tools, techniques, and
activities. We also look at the taxonomy from the perspective of
the SA and CSA definitions and find common ground. Finally, we
identify and summarize the contemporary challenges of CSA re-
search and development, namely from the perspective of data and
tools. The identified challenges pave the way for future work and
research directions.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents the basic concepts of situational awareness and its appli-
cation in the cyber domain. Section 3 presents a brief review of
related literature. Section 4 presents an updated taxonomy of CSA.
Section 5 identifies research and operational challenges for CSA.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 FROM SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TO
CYBER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Cyber situational awareness (CSA) is an application of a more
general approach, situational awareness (SA). In order to be able
to comprehend the cyber situational awareness to all its extends,
we need to present the basics background of the underlying sit-
uational awareness first. The description of the evolution of SA
and explanation of the basic SA definitions will allow for the cor-
rect understanding of the concept of the CSA. Hence, this section
presents the origins and basic definitions of situational awareness,
followed by the description of the cyber situational awareness and
its domain-originated specifics.
2.1 Situational Awareness
Situational awareness has always been needed in everyday life. A
prehistoric hunter undoubtedly needed to observe and understand
various inputs from his environment to efficiently hunt down prey
bigger and stronger than him, and not to become prey himself at
the same time. For many years, SA principles were used in everyday
life intuitively. However, the intuitive SA began insufficient as the
technology improved, and the complexity of the world increased.
People had to start using SA consciously.
The origins of a concept that can be referred to as situational
awareness date back to World War I where Oswald Boelke realized
the importance of gaining an awareness of the enemy before the
enemy gained a similar awareness and devise methods for accom-
plishing this [36]. After the World Wars, the concept of SA did not
receive too much attention in literature until the late 1980s [88].
The push came from the aviation domain, where the automation
systems were no longer optimized for human operation and even
overstepped the human’s capability to keep track of the current
situation in some cases [83]. The idea of separation between the
human operator’s understanding of system status and actual system
status emerged and became a crux of the definition of SA [97].
The conceptual basis SA had been cloudy before 1990. The main
theoretic foundations were laid during the last decade of the 20th
century. During the decade, underlying theoretical works were
published by Smith and Hancock (1995) [87], Endsley (1995) [29],
and Bedny and Meister (1999) [9]. Although SA was already con-
ceptually defined, it was still met with a fair amount of criticism
claiming that SA is a too subjective phenomenon to be measured
objectively [83]. Hence, approaches to objective SA measurement
were introduced in a short time (e.g., in [27]), and researchers kept
their interest in the topic.
Since then, the application of the concept of SA has quickly
spread to other domains than aviation. The most prominent driver
of this widespread has been the technology. The complexity of sys-
tems and their dynamics and automation has increased rapidly due
to introduced technologies, such as IoT and ICS/SCADA systems.
The automation of these areas has moved an operator from an ac-
tive role of searching information in a decision process to a decision
maker that consumes information from systems and formulates his
decision using the information. SA is being introduced to various ar-
eas (power grids, strategic and tactical systems, medicine, and also
cyberspace) to ensure that an operator assesses a situation correctly
based on received data and can make an informed decision.
2.1.1 Definitions of SA. Three main definitions dominate the field
of situational awareness [88]. We mention all three definitions
with particular attention to Endsley’s definition as her definition
is widely adopted in the literature and serves as a base ground for
further research in CSA. Detailed analysis of all three definitions
in the context of CSA can be found in [53].
Smith and Hancock proposed the perceptual cycle definition
in [88] that is suitable for explaining the dynamic aspect of SA,
such as how the momentary knowledge is updated and how the
search for information is initiated. The definition provides a high-
level overview of a person interacting with an environment. Bedny
and Meister [9] proposed the interactive sub-system definition that
is suitable when considering underlying functions and how they
interact [88]. This view focuses on the processes that are used by
an individual during situation assessment.
Endsley proposed the three-level model definition: Situational
Awareness is the perception of the elements in the environment within
a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and
the projection of their status in the near future. [26] Definition of
SA by Endsley has been widely accepted and is used in a great
variety of functional areas, for example, in medicine or vehicle
operations [30]. Endsley apprehends SA as a state of knowledge
and distinguishes it from the processes used to achieve the state.
The definition consists of three ascending primary components
















Figure 1: Three-level model (adapted from [29]).
At the first level, the level of perception of the elements in the
environment, status attributes and dynamics of relevant attributes
of an environment are perceived [26]. The correct perception is
crucial for the outcome of SA. If the data obtained at this level are
biased, inaccurate, or misleading, the operator gains the notion of
the situation that does not comply with the real world state. With-
out the correct basic perception of relevant information, the odds
of forming an incorrect picture of the situation increases dramati-
cally [28]. No interpretation of the acquired data is performed at
this stage. All interpretation is left to the next level. This level is
intended to represent to initial reception of information in the raw
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form. The separation of data capture and data comprehension and
interpretation allows identifying discrepancies that might occur
when requiring data from senses and sensors. One such a problem
solved in SA is the data overload. [60] An operator is overwhelmed
with sensors and data, and relevant information is not perceived.
Jones et al. [55] found that 76 % of SA errors in pilots could be caused
by problems in the perception of relevant information (either failure
of the sensors or problems with the cognitive process).
On the second level, the comprehension of the current situation,
the SA goes beyond the simple perception of the data. The goal is
not only to perceive the situation but to understand the situation
correctly. The comprehension of a situation is based on a synthesis
of disjoint elements perceived at Level 1 [26]. The elements are
combined, interpreted, assigned with significance concerning given
goals, and combined with knowledge of an operator to form a
holistic picture of an environment. The difference between the
levels is analogous to having a reading comprehension (Level 2)
and reading individual words (Level 1). For example, an operator
of an oil platform needs to put together pieces of information to
derive the actual status of the platform’s systems. An operator’s
expertise is a vital requirement at this level. At the perception
level, a novice and an experienced operator would reach the same
results in situation assessment. At the comprehension level, a lack
of expertise would cause the novice’s inability to follow basic lines
of search coherently for further information or to misinterpretation
of the current situation [83].
The projection of future status is the third and highest level
of SA. This level is the basis for being ahead of the plane [83]. In
the majority of fields, where SA is of importance, experienced
operators rely heavily on future projection. The future projection
based on current events and dynamics enables them to anticipate
future events and their implications, which allows them to make
decision in time [28]. For example, an experienced driver differs
from a common driver. Unlike a common driver, the experienced
driver can foresee possible traffic and, thus, prevent collisions more
efficiently.
2.2 Cyber Situational Awareness
CSA builds upon the Endsley’s three-level definition: Cyber Sit-
uational Awareness is the perception of the elements in the cyber
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of
their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. The
term environment in the definition refers to the cyber environment
or cyberspace. This section discusses the specifics of the application
of the general SA concept into the cyber environment.
2.2.1 Specifics of CSA. Although a general definition of SA can
also be applied to the CSA, there are several specifics of the cyber
environment that need to be considered. These specifics have a
significant effect on SA and, to some extent, shape the approach to
SA and the research efforts for CSA. One of the original applications
of SA is in the area of conventional military conflict. Therefore, we
demonstrate the specifics of the CSA with a comparison to the SA
for military purposes. Although we highlight differences between
cyber and military SA, these two types are not contradictory. On
the contrary, CSA complements SA for a military operation as both
virtual and conventional battlefields are encompassed in the current
Information Age conflicts [60]. The specifics of CSA are presented
in the following paragraphs.
Cyber Environment – There are almost limitless possibilities
in the cyber environment. The cyber environment has no borders.
This dynamic world is highly malleable and potentially scale-free.
The dynamics and limitlessness of such an environment is a chal-
lenge for situation assessment compared to the physical world
of conventional military conflicts, where the environment is im-
mutable and govern by the law of physics. The conflicts are po-
tentially scale-free [68], an attack can come out of the blue with
no warning, and the costs of joining a conflict are low. The spatial
properties of the cyber environment are global [20], which makes
the determination of the SA boundaries problematic if we do not
want to use specification "everything/everywhere." Therefore, the
physical location of the network or system is usually used as a
spatial boundary for CSA [11].
Perception – Information for military SA can be captured both
via specifics hardware sensors and by physical observation. The
hardware sensors and signal processing techniques play an im-
portant but not an essential role; a physical observation can be
used in cases hardware sensors are not available. In the CSA, the
information is gained solely by sensors. It is not possible to observe
the information directly. Each sensor is a complex system that can
be misused or deceived to provide false information. The inability
to confirm information from a sensor by direct observation limits
chances to see through the deception. Similarly to information,
adversaries cannot be directly observed. They can be detected only
by an analysis of information captured by sensors, which allows
the adversaries to stay hidden in a network.
Performance – The required resources for launching an attack
in a cyber environment are relatively small. Compared to a state
or organization required in a conventional conflict, the resources
needed for starting a cyber conflict may scale down to an individual
with a few prerequisites. Another factor to consider concerning the
performance is the speed of the events. The speed of the events
is orders of magnitude quicker than in case of physical conflicts.
The resources needed for the processing of such large volumes of
information are significantly higher in the case of CSA.
Attacker Takes theAdvantage –According to traditional mili-
tary doctrine, a defender gains numerous advantages, e.g., defensive
fortification, information asymmetry) [60]. A cyber-attacker over-
takes all advantages in the case of cyber conflicts. The advantages
of a cyber-attacker include, but are not limited to, anonymity (it can
hide across national sovereignty boundaries), global reach to probe
weaknesses, social engineering to exploit human weaknesses, and
a possibility to pick a time, place and tools for an attack.
2.2.2 Entities in CSA. Entities relevant to CSA are part of a cy-
ber environment, as stated in CSA definition. We identified the
following major types of entities in the context of CSA based on
the above-described definitions: physical, immaterial, and human
entities. Individual entities interact with each other and together
influence the creation of CSA. It is important to note that an ele-
ment that forms the CSA does not necessarily have access to all
information on entities.
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A group of physical entities comprises the physical base of the
cyber environment. This group includes computers and their periph-
erals, network infrastructure formed by wires, switches, routers,
and other networking devices. Each device can be described by
its properties. The properties can be physical, e.g., number and
frequency of computer processing units, random access memory
size or volume of the disk space, or describing, e.g., the throughput
or packet loss for a wireline. The properties can also cover general
characteristics, e.g., the criticality of a computer or line. Besides the
characteristics, each element plays a specific role. A computer can
be, e.g., a workstation or server. A router can play a role of either
a central, vital element of infrastructure or be a low-importance
device in the last mile of some insignificant local network.
Next, we introduce a group of immaterial entities to capture
the virtual essence of the cyber environment. The immaterial en-
tities serve as a "new edge" for communication between humans
and computers or between computers themselves. The immaterial
entities cover computer programs, services provided in a network,
and so forth. Each of the entities can be assigned a set of properties.
For example, a service can be characterized by an availability, set of
functionalities it offers, confidentiality, and so forth. The immaterial
entities had originally a strong relationship with a physical entity
(a service was hosted on a given physical server). With advances
in cloud computing and virtualization, the relation with a physical
entity loosens, though.
The last group, human entities, represents people interacting
with the computers. Among the properties of the human entities
relevant for CSA belong to experience, attention, determination,
perceptual skills, short/long term memory capabilities, and analytic
skill [29]. A human entity is also characterized by an assigned role
that partially determines the goals of the human and, consequently,
the situation assessment process. Each role would require slightly
different information, comprehension, and projection to reach CSA.
Roles that we consider in this paper relevant for CSA divide into
two main groups – attacker and defender roles. The attacker role
represent an adversary that intends to do deliberate harm to the
object of interest. A defender protects an entrusted asset against the
attacker. The defender roles can be, e.g., security analysts (analyze
and assess existing vulnerabilities in IT infrastructure), or security
architects and engineers (design and utilize technologies to enhance
security) [4]. Although all mentioned roles constitute the cyber
environment, only human entities usually reach CSA. All three
entities form cyberspace, and therefore they are part of the CSA, i.e.,
are part of the knowledge of the situation. They form the situation
and influence its state. However, the actual knowledge of a situation
(CSA) is associated with human entities only.
3 REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON CSA
Herein, we provide an overview of existing research on CSA. First,
we provide an overview of scientific publishing on CSA, namely
the numbers of publications on the topic in recent years and identi-
fication of the most impactful publications. Second, we introduce
leading researchers and research groups and highlight their con-
tributions. Subsequently, we provide a brief overview of available
datasets and illustrate how CSA is adopted in national policies.
3.1 Publications on CSA
The need and relevance of research on CSA are demonstrated by
the increasing numbers of research published on this topic. We
queried five scientific databases (ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore,
Scopus, Springer, and Web of Science) for keywords cyber situa-
tion(al) awareness for the last ten years, i.e., from 2009 to 2019. The
numbers of publications on CSA published thorough the years are
presented in Figure 2. We may see that the number of publications
on CSA published each year is rising, especially in IEEE Xplore,
where we found mostly research papers. Springer database indexes
mostly books and their chapters and, thus, thematic publications,
such as Theory and Models for Cyber Situation Awareness [66] with
many chapters on CSA, count multiple times.
Figure 2: Number of published papers on CSA.
According to the survey by Franke and Brynielsson [33] con-
ducted in 2014, the majority of publications covered the design
of CSA and attack detection and analysis while application area,
thread description, and workflows were covered rather sporadically.
In recent years, we see a rising number of applied research and
experimental development. Probably the best-known tools were
proposed by MITRE [92], such as CyGraph [73]. Applied research
and experimental deployment are becoming subject of research by
other research groups as well [48, 54, 56, 78, 80].
Most important publications on CSA are these two following col-
lections: Cyber Situational Awareness: Issues and Research edited by
Jajodia et al. (2010) [49] and Cyber Defense and Situational Awareness
by Kott et al. (2014) [60]. These collections provide a comprehen-
sive introduction to the topic, an explanation of basic concepts,
and a discussion on prevailing open issues. A summary of recent
research advances in CSA is summarized in collection Theory and
Models for Cyber Situation Awareness by Liu et al. from 2017 [66].
An exhausting overview of the literature is provided by Franke
and Brynielsson [33]. The authors provide a literature overview
for specifics areas of CSA, such as industrial control systems, emer-
gency management, and military. They also list design papers on
tools and visualizations for CSA. We were not able to find a similar
survey covering the area of CSA published since then. A very brief
survey covering the anomaly detection area of CSA was published
in 2015 by Friedberg et al. [34]. The latest review of current CSA
models and definitions was published in 2018 by Cooke et al. [19].
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3.2 Research Groups
Apart from fundamental publications, we also review leading re-
search groups in the CSA field. A strong research group has been
established at the Center for Secure Information Systems at George
Mason University1. The director of this group, prof. Sushil Jajodia,
Ph.D., gathered a strong team of scientists and started to research
the CSA in the project Computer-aided Human Centric Cyber Situ-
ation Awareness. The team’s members worth mentioning are Mas-
similiano Albanese, Ph.D. who is interested in modeling network
attack and network hardening, and Steven Noel, Ph.D. whose main
research area is attack modeling, graph analytics, and visualiza-
tions for information security. The group significantly contributes
to the formation of CSA [4, 7], to models underlying CSA [5, 40, 50],
and to CSA measurement [35]. Further, the group investigated the
concept of attack graphs and their application in CSA [74–76], net-
work hardening [94] along with relevant strategies [6], and cyber
deception [3, 51, 52]. The group has also developed a framework for
cyber situational awareness that integrates an array of techniques
and automated tools [48, 71]. The framework is able among others
to represent dependencies in a network or model attack scenarios
using attack graphs.
Another research group is led by Alexander Kott at the U.S.
Army Research Laboratory (ARL) 2. They also contributed to the
fundamentals of CSA by the formalization of cybersecurity prob-
lems [57, 58] and editing a collection that provide an introduction to
the basics principles of CSA [60]. The ARL is interested in industrial
control system protection; risk modeling and intrusion detection
are investigated in [16], metrics of SCADA security in [17], and sim-
ulation of the cyber defense in [15]. Other topics under the research
focus of the ARL related to CSA are the resilience of the cyber sys-
tems and networks [59, 65], modeling of cyber intrusions [14, 15, 64],
and attack prediction [81].
Prof. Shanchieh Jay Yang led a research group focusing on sev-
eral aspects of CSA at Rochester Institute of Technology3. The
group has contributed to the major publications on CSA with sit-
uation assessment research [24, 43, 44]. This group specializes in
the area of attack modeling and prediction. They investigate dif-
ferent approaches to attack prediction [98], including Bayesian
networks [79], time series forecasting [96], and likelihood estima-
tion using rare-event simulation [61]. They are especially interested
in multi-stage cyber attacks. Their research in this area includes
the characterization of multi-stage cyber attacks [23, 25] and the
creation of a system for multi-stage attack emulation that fuses
concepts from computer networks, system vulnerabilities, attack be-
haviors, and scenarios [70]. More recent works include generating
attack models without a priori knowledge [78] and investigating
the use of Generative Adversarial Networks to learn and generate
synthetic alert scenarios [90].
The next research group investigating CSAhas formed in Sweden
at Swedish Defense Research Agency4 and RISE SICS5. The group
is represented mainly by ass. Prof. Joel Brynielsson, Ulrik Franke,






of literature on CSA [33] that provides a systematic overview of
research areas in CSA and the number of published papers. Further,
the group researches CSA testing [11], modeling an attacker via
attack persona concept [10], and differences in understanding of
CSA between normal and IT skilled employers [91].
Another research group was formed around dr. Florian Skopik
at Center for Digital Safety and Security of AIT Austrian Institute
of Technology6. The researchers at AIT investigates the decision
support models in CSA used in cyber operation/security centers [38,
82], CSA in smart grids [85], and network anomaly detection [34].
The design of a system for national situational awareness [86] is
also investigated by this group.
Finally, a research group on CSA has been established at the
Computer Security Incident Response Team ofMasaryk University7.
The network-wide cyber situational awareness with a focus on the
perception and comprehension using IP flows is investigated by
Jirsík et al. [53, 54]. Husák et al. focused on the predictive aspects
of CSA [46, 47]. Other team members investigated criticality and
dependency detection [62] or data models for CSA [56].
3.3 Data for CSA Research
The research on CSA is held back by a lack of available datasets
that provide solid ground truth. However, this is a concern for the
whole cybersecurity. Although there were several frequently used
datasets available for research intrusion detection, they were shown
to be insufficient for advanced analyses, such as attack projection
and intention recognition [47]. The datasets are either artificial
or collected from a live environment. The artificial datasets offer
ground truth and may include documentation on network topology,
intentions of the attackers, and other valuable insights. However,
they may lack background traffic, random noise, anomalies, and
unknown threats that pose a major challenge for live deployment
of any intrusion detection or CSA methodology. Datasets captured
in a live environment are closer to the actual needs of cyberse-
curity operations but lack ground truth and need to be properly
anonymized. In addition, all the datasets become obsolete quickly.
The datasets, in most cases, contain traces of network traffic
that are used to evaluate intrusion detection. Probably the best
known are the DARPA datasets8 that are now considered obsolete
but were very popular in the past. More recent and popular datasets
are CTU-139 and a collection of datasets by the University of New
Brunswick10. Only some of those datasets are accompanied by in-
trusion detection rules that allow for generating alerts and network
topologies that allow for impact assessment and other CSA-related
research. Alert correlation in a collaborative environment can be
evaluated using a live dataset from the SABU project11. Global CSA
can be studied using the live data from network telescope and other
sensors by CAIDA12. MM-TBM dataset13 is an example of artificial
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3.4 National Strategies
The CSA has been included in the cybersecurity strategies of many
nations, which indicates the need and importance of CSA even at
the national level. For example, the Australian Cyber Security Op-
erations Centre provides the Australian Government with all-source
cyber situational awareness and an enhanced ability to facilitate oper-
ational responses to cybersecurity events of national importance [18].
The United States of America define their role in cyberspace’s fu-
ture defense as steady progress towards shared situational awareness
of network vulnerabilities and risks among public and private sector
networks [77]. In addition, the National Institute of Standards and
Technologies refers to the CSA as a new way to attack and cyberse-
curity issues rather than using a system defense approach [72]. The
German national cybersecurity strategy [32] establishes National
Cyber Response Center to directly inform the crisis management
staff headed by the responsible State Secretary at the Federal Ministry
of the Interior if the cybersecurity situation reaches the level of an
imminent or already occurred crisis. The United Kingdom aims to
enhance cyber threat awareness, detection, and reaction functions,
through the development of a Cyber Security Operations Centre that
uses state-of-the-art defensive cyber capabilities to protect the cy-
berspace and deal with threats [41]. The Canadian Cyber Incident
Response Centre serves to be the focal point for monitoring and
providing advice on mitigating cyber threats, and directing the na-
tional response to any cybersecurity incident as described in Canada’s
Cyber Security Strategy [37].
4 TAXONOMY AND COMPONENTS OF CSA
Given the number of research works on definitions and concepts
of SA and CSA, there are surprisingly not many taxonomies or
overviews of its components, namely from a more technical or
applied perspective. To the best of our knowledge, there is only
one work that puts together various components and tools used to
achieve and maintain CSA. Evesti et al. [31] provided a taxonomy
of cybersecurity situational awareness consisting of data gathering
(operational and strategic), analysis, and visualization. We argue
that this taxonomy does not conform to the models and definitions
of SA and CSA discussed earlier in the paper. However, it may be
linked to the three-level model by Endsley [26]. The data gathering
is nicely structured and corresponds to the perception level. The
analysis and visualization both correspond to the comprehension
level and, in our opinion, complement and influence each other.
What is missing in this taxonomy is the categorization of projection
level and any related tools and approaches.
To overcome the issues of the taxonomy by Evesti et al. [31],
we outlined an improved taxonomy of cyber situational awareness
in Figure 3. The most important changes happened on the top
level, where we adapted the taxonomy to reflect the three-level
model of SA by Endsley [26]. The original Data Gathering category
matches the Perception level very well. We moved the remaining
two top-level categories, Analysis and Visualization, under the new
Comprehension level. Finally, we added the Projection level that was
missing in the original taxonomy.
We do not propose many changes in the perception level. The
operational and strategic subcategories are very convenient and
reflect the different needs of cybersecurity operations in day-to-
day incident handling as opposed to the needs of cybersecurity
analysts, who need more think in longer terms. In the operational
subcategory, we added network traffic monitoring [42] as a very
important source of data for achieving network-wide SA. In the
strategic subcategory, we added OSINT (open-source intelligence)
and CTI (cyber threat intelligence) as they both are recent emerging
sources of information for cybersecurity analysts. OSINT extends
former item of news review and covers any publicly available source
of information.
The comprehension level covers analysis and visualization. We
perceive the two subcategories as complementing each other as
they both increase the comprehension of the situation. We made
several changes in these subcategories. First, we moved system log
parsing to the operational perception level as it is another source of
information, although we acknowledge it is mostly used in the anal-
ysis when closely investigating some phenomenon. Subsequently,
we replaced clustering with data mining because many more data
mining approaches might be used. We also merged it with ma-
chine learning as they mostly complement each other. The original
taxonomy [31] includes several examples in Metrics. It is indeed
advisable to set metrics, although many of them are not transfer-
able to a different environment. However, we would like to add
changes in time, such as an increase or decrease of observed values,
that provide valuable insights into the evolving situation. Time
series are effective models that can be used to further analyze such
changes [47]. Finally, anomaly detection is quite confusing because
it may fit well in both perception and comprehension, depending
on if it is an anomaly detection processing primary data, such as
network traffic and system logs, or inferred data, such as security
alerts.
The taxonomy of the projection level is borrowed from the sur-
vey of attack projection, prediction, and forecasting by Husák et
al. [47], who defined use cases for predictive tasks in cybersecu-
rity. The attack projection [98] and intention recognition [2, 69] are
very similar, in essence. They typically use attack models, such as
attack graphs, to match observed events to a known scenario and
to either project the continuation of an attack, i.e., estimate the
most probable next step of an adversary or estimate the adversary’s
intention by finding a continuation of an attack from which the
adversary may profit the most. Intrusion prediction [1, 8] covers
various methods of predicting particular events, such as particular
attacks and exploitations. Network security situation forecasting [63]
covers various approaches to forecast holistic cybersecurity situ-
ation, such as an increase or decrease in the number of expected
attacks. The last two categories often rely on time series analysis
and other statistical inferences but may also involve predictions
based on unconventional sources, such as recent news or sentiment
on social media [80].
5 CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES FOR CSA
Adaptation of Situational Awareness to the cyber domain is not
straightforward, due to several characteristics in its operations,
adversaries, and the observability of the activities. Earlier works,
including [22, 44, 60], discussed several challenges that are unique
in enabling CSA. This section extracts prior works as well as our
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Figure 3: Taxonomy of Cyber Situational Awareness tools and components.
renewed perspectives, and present a summary of the contemporary
challenges for CSA. We consider the challenges from the perspec-
tives of Data and Toolsets, respectively, that are specific to the cyber
domain.
5.1 The Data Perspective
Analogous to the big data challenges [21, 95], CSA shares many and
exhibits some unique characteristics in volume, velocity, veracity,
variety, and volatility. According to the Cisco report on IP traffic
forecast [13], the volume of global IP traffic was 96 EB per month
in 2016 and is expected to rise to 278 EB per month by 2021. The
velocity of the network traffic is forecast to nearly double by 2021.
The variety of the network traffic will increase too as new applica-
tions and protocols are continuously developed (e.g., the number
of applications in Apple App Store increased from 585 thousand
in 2012 to 2.2 million in 2017 [89]). The value of the information
in network traffic can be demonstrated by the market value of the
network security segment that is estimated to reach 11,669 million
USD at the end of 2018 [93]. Each of the demonstrated big data
characteristics of CSA data opens new challenges for CSA.
Volume with Velocity and Veracity – The volume of the data
captured and produced by sensors in cyberspace provides an op-
erator with a massive amount of available information. However,
information and data are usually in a raw form that brings little
understanding to an operator. An operator is overloaded with data
with no meaning to him/her. This challenge can be appropriately
summarized as Data overload – meaning underload, as mentioned
in [60]. To make things worse, the velocity of incoming data com-
bined with a demand for real-time analyses and results delivery
puts challenging requirements on the data processing. Tools for
data processing and analysis need to provide sufficient throughput
to process all data at high-speeds. Moreover, the real-time data
processing puts an emphasis on correct time ordering of data as
events occur at millisecond or faster rates in cyberspace. Correct
time ordering of the events is required for data analyses where
causality is of interest (e.g., root-cause analyses, advanced persis-
tent threat detection). With a large volume of data coming in at high
speed, the actual critical and malicious activities may only trigger
a very small number of intrusion alerts, resulting in an extremely
high noise-to-signal ratio that requires intelligent systems that can
recognize rare yet contextually critical events.
Variety and Volatility – The variety of data opens challenges
in homogenizing data from different sources and of different types,
as well as due to the heterogeneous attack behaviors/tactics and net-
work protocol and system configurations. In term of homogeniza-
tion, typical security operations desire central processing, e.g., in a
data cloud, which require proper metrics and alert thresholds [22].
Data refinement and normalization is necessary to transform into a
common format for effective data synthesis [22] while maintaining
the original characteristics and dealing with data duplication, un-
reliable sources, and errors. The complexity and rapidly evolving
network protocols and services, as well as cyberattack behaviors,
aggravates the already challenging problem of variety by intro-
ducing the volatility into the meanings of information retrieved
from past data. New nodes are added or removed, systems are up-
dated, new technologies are introduced, and entities are entering or
leaving with mobile technologies. Models and patterns learned in
recent months, weeks, or even days, may not be applicable tomor-
row. According to Symantec 2017 Internet Security Threat Report,
375 M of new malware variants were discovered in 2017 [12]. At
any given point in time, security analysts must deal with a large
variety of user, system, and adversary behaviors, most of which
may not be quite dependent on what has been observed in the past.
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This requires an intelligent system that not only can homogenize
the variety of cyber sensors but also quickly adapt to the complex
and changing environment and adversary behaviors.
5.2 The Toolset Perspective
The cyber big data challenges are tightly coupled with those present
in the contemporary toolsets. A toolset used by an operator sig-
nificantly influences his/her level of CSA. An operator observes
cyberspace using different monitoring tools, considers standardized
threat models, comprehends data via tools for data analysis, and
presents results utilizing various visualization tools. The proper-
ties, functions, and performance of available toolset determine an
understanding of the current situation and its assessment. Many
tools are under rapid development [93] and research. Yet many
improvements and additional features are desired. We continue to
present the toolset challenges by referencing to the big data V’s.
Variety with Veracity and Volatility – A CSA operator needs
various information from different data sources (network traffic,
logs, ADS and IDS systems, antivirus tools, threat intelligence re-
ports, and so forth). A special tool is needed to process data from
each different source, and an operator is forced to switch between
the tools and utilize a number of different analysis workflows to
retrieve needed information. These create a highly manually inten-
sive process that hampers current cyber operations. Cybersecurity
vendors are racing to introduce new tools for network visibility,
attack detection, and cyber defense to ease complex network com-
prehension and to reduce a workload on a human operator. This
creates a tension for specialized tools versus integrated and uni-
fied platform for CSA data analytics. In addition, many industry
standards and taxonomies, such as the various attack reference
models and tools of similar functions present interoperability is-
sues across organizations and countries. The variety of toolsets
and standards causes unnecessary overhead while the same cyber
adversary can attack many places at once – creating an increasingly
asymmetric cyber warfare. To make things worse, the trend in cy-
ber defense requires shared threat intelligence; yet, the fidelity in
these intelligence reports are still low, causing concern of trust for
applicability and usability of supposedly advance warnings. The va-
riety in toolsets, compounded with the fidelity in the analytics and
threat intelligence as well as the need to adapt to new toolsets and
standards, pose unprecedented challenges for the cyber operators
to ever become effective.
Value through Visualization – The value of data is deter-
mined by the value of information (as defined in [45]) carried in
data for an operator of CSA. The information carried in data is,
however, devaluated by the presence of a high noise-to-signal ratio.
Anomalous events are common in a cyber world, systems might not
work properly, users behave unexpectedly, protocols are not used
according to standards, and so forth. Such disruptions to a ‘normal’
behavior complicate relevant information retrieval and introduce
a noise into data, which reduces its value. A plausible solution
to overcome the high noise-to-signal ratio is through visualiza-
tion of intelligent system outputs – visual analytics. It is not news
that visualization plays a crucial role in situation comprehension.
Several past works [39, 67, 84] have discussed visualization ap-
proaches for cybersecurity. Nevertheless, many issues remain open
for research, including big data visualization, SDN networks, and
human-centered evaluation [39]. One open issue related directly
to CSA is a visualization of large-scale complex and dynamically
changing networks [60]. The visualization of the networks should
be able to scale across levels of detail and across time so that an
operator has an instant approach to both overview and detailed
information. Additionally, as CSA moves into ‘anticipation,’ visual-
ization of projected or predicted scenarios with traceable evidence
is a new challenge to bring actionable intelligence to the cyber op-
erators. This may present uncharted scientific challenges as cyber
predictions may involve novel events that have rarely occurred or
never happened yet for the operator.
Performance amid Volume, Velocity, Veracity, and Volatil-
ity – The performance challenge is closely related to data challenges
described above, namely the big data characteristics of data pro-
cessed in CSA. The volume and speed of the processed data impose
a demanding requirement for data processing and computational
powers of current CSA tools. Namely, scalability and throughput
of the tools are currently trending challenges for CSA toolset. The
scalability challenge could potentially be met by the development
of cloud-based distributed solutions. The throughput is increased
by an extensive parallelization of computations and data processing
tasks. A novel approach to scalability and throughput challenges
that is gaining attention is distributed data stream processing. Other
challenges of CSA related to performance are the reduction of anal-
ysis time and response time. The operator needs new information
as soon as possible to be able to react in time. The approaches to the
analysis of CSA data are subjects to delay, partially by their design
and by the big data processed. The data processing workflows and
analysis methods need to be improved and optimized to reduce de-
lays caused by data analysis. The above performance gains must be
maintained (or suffer minimal degradation) even in the presence of
high noise-to-signal ratio and rapidly evolving nature of adversary
behaviors and network environments.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed the current state of research on cyber
situational awareness, an essential concept in cyber defense. We
first discussed the way from generic situational awareness to cyber
situational awareness and pinpointed unique features of situational
awareness in the cyber environment. Subsequently, we provided a
brief overview of research on CSA, introduced the most impactful
researchers and research groups, identified fundamental works,
and provided an insight into trends in publishing on the topic. The
number of new publications on CSA per year is still rising and may
see a move of attention from fundamental research on principles
of CSA towards applied research and experimental development.
We may expect that this trend will continue, and we will see more
applied research works, tools, and reports from their experimental
or operational deployment. We also showed several examples of
CSA in national cybersecurity strategies, which illustrate the wide
interest in the topic. Further, we proposed an updated taxonomy of
CSA tools and components that are used for achieving and main-
taining CSA. Finally, we identified and summarized open research
and operational challenges for CSA that we see as the most impor-
tant and prospective in the near future. First, we need to cope with
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rising volume, variety, and velocity of the data as cybersecurity
data has effectively become big data. Second, there is a need to
propose novel tools to support CSA operators with the right data
at the right time, visualize the data in a meaningful manner, and
maintain sufficient performance.
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